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INTRODUCTION 
Receiving an acceptance letter from a university is a thrilling 
milestone in the life of an American student, because it opens up to the door 
to new possibilities and new paths, oftentimes with those paths leading into 
new states. However, the excitement fades quite a bit when the student 
receives the follow-up letter with a tuition price tag stamped on it. The 
tuition price tag particularly hits hard the student who chooses to attend a 
university in a state where the student does not live, regardless of whether 
that student wants to stay in that new state post-graduation. Suddenly, that 
milestone of going to college seems a little less thrilling. 
People often move to a new state for reasons other than education, 
such as for a new job, to be closer to family, or to establish a comfortable 
life for themselves and their spouses and children. As a result of moving to 
the new state, people can become interested in pursuing a new academic 
degree from a university within that state. However, if the student attempts 
to attend a university in that new state too quickly after moving there, the 
student is penalized with an out-of-state tuition price tag. On the other end 
of the spectrum, people often attend a university in their home states with 
every intention of moving to a new state post-graduation. Those students 
get the benefit of in-state tuition rates prior to leaving the state altogether. 
State universities charging out-of-state tuition prices through the 
use of durational residency requirements is unconstitutional in violation of 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV for students who come 
into a state in order to attend school there because the practice hinders the 
operation of a system of higher education within the nation as a whole by 
allowing states to confer the privilege of in-state tuition upon residents that 
people coming into the state from other states do not receive. Additionally, 
the practice of using durational residency requirements in determining who 
is eligible for in-state tuition violates the right to travel as protected under 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
right to travel is violated because the requirements create discriminatory 
classifications among newer residents and long-term residents that penalize 
the right of a citizen to be treated the same in his new state of residence as 
those who have already lived there for the period of time specified by the 
durational residency requirement. Furthermore, the practice of charging 
out-of-state tuition rates to students who come into the state from external 
states poses serious policy concerns through unfair application of durational 
residency requirements. This practice places a significant obstacle in the 
way of students who wish to obtain a higher education at a university in 
another state in the form of exponentially higher tuition rates. 
In Section I, this Note first looks at residency as states define it for 
tuition purposes and how states use durational residency requirements to 
determine whether a student qualifies for in-state tuition rates or not. In 
Section II, this Note discusses the history of the Privileges and Immunities 
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Clause of Article IV in order to provide a background for how this issue fits 
within the protections of the clause, taking a look at its origins and its 
evolution. In Section III, this Note discusses the constitutional implications 
of a state conferring the benefit of in-state tuition on its residents to the 
detriment of students coming from out of state under the purview of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. In Section IV, this Note 
discusses the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to see how these protections apply to the states and, more 
specifically, how out-of-state tuition prices infringe upon the right to travel 
as protected under this clause. In Section V, this Note’s primary argument 
outlines how the practice of imposing durational residency requirements for 
in-state tuition purposes violates the right to travel under the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
I. RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS: HOW AND WHY STATES IMPOSE THEM 
In order to qualify for in-state tuition, generally a student must 
classify as a resident of that state. Before discussing why these residency 
requirements raise constitutional concerns, this Note will address how a 
citizen establishes residency, how states define what a resident is for 
purposes of in-state tuition, and why states impose these residency 
requirements on in-state tuition. In general, there are two requirements that 
a citizen must meet in order to establish residency in a given state.1 The 
first requirement is that the person must be physically present in the state in 
which he or she seeks to establish residency, and the second requirement is 
that the person is in that state with the intent to remain there indefinitely.2 
The term “residency” is often referred to as “domicile,” and the two are 
used interchangeably.3 
States maintain the power to classify students on the basis of 
residency for purposes of in-state versus out-of-state tuition.4 Further, states 
may, and sometimes do, define what a resident is for purposes of tuition 
differently than how they define what a resident is for other purposes.5 
Most universities will follow the two requirements noted above and require 
that students be residents, or legally domiciled, in the state in which the 
university is located.6 Typically, universities will attempt to ensure that a 
                                                 
 1. Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 330 (1983). 
 2. Id. at 331. 
 3. John W. Anderson, Strangers in Their Own Land: Durational Residency 
Requirements for Tuition Purposes, Though Illegal, are Here to Stay, 85 NEB. L. REV. 1058, 
1060 (2007). 
 4. Thompson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Neb., 188 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Neb. 1971). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Thomas B. Parent, Tuition Residence Requirements: A Second Look in Light of 
Zobel and Martinez, 61 IND. L.J. 287, 289 (1985). 
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student is a resident of the state in which the university is located by 
imposing a durational residency requirement.7 
How do states impose these durational residency requirements? To 
begin with, the requirements usually include actual presence in the state for 
six months to one year prior to enrollment in the university.8 Students will 
have to prove that they have resided in the state for a specified period of 
time and that they intend to remain in the state indefinitely.9 Different 
requirements for showing residency in the state are often put in state 
statutes and vary from state to state.10 Some states delegate the 
responsibility of establishing these requirements to the state board of higher 
education, and the board can further delegate to the individual 
universities.11 Students generally have to show residency using 
government-issued IDs, and at least one ID must have a date on it showing 
that the student has been a resident for the specified period of time.12 
Some states (California, for example) ask that the student 
demonstrate that they have been both self-supporting and actually present in 
the state for the specified period of time.13 States can also impose an age 
requirement on whether a student is eligible for in-state tuition benefits on 
top of the durational residency requirement.14 The individual will have to 
demonstrate a stronger connection to the state in which the university is 
located than any connection that the individual may have with other 
states.15 Continued involvement in civic or community organizations is one 
way that a student can show a connection to the state and actual presence in 
the state.16 Owning a home within the state is helpful for, but not conclusive 
of, establishing residency because some students have vacation homes that 
are not where they actually reside.17 
For states that do impose a durational residency requirement, 
determining what is a “reasonable” requirement is unclear,18 and states 
enforce them differently. For instance, some states will not count any of the 
time that a student spends in the state prior to enrollment in the university 
for the purpose of attending that university towards the waiting time 
required by the durational residency requirement.19 Regardless of the length 
                                                 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Lawrence J. Conlan, Durational Residency Requirements for In-State Tuition: 
Searching for Access to Affordable Higher Learning, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1389, 1390 (2002). 
 10. In-State Tuition and State Residency Requirements, FINAID PAGE, LLC, 
http://www.finaid.org/otheraid/stateresidency.phtml (last visited Nov. 12, 2016). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Conlan, supra note 9, at 1390. 
 14. In-State Tuition and State Residency Requirements, supra note 10. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Conlan, supra note 9, at 1390. 
 19. Parent, supra note 6, at 289. 
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of the waiting period, durational residency requirements specify that a 
student must reside within the state for a certain period of time before they 
can claim that they have been deprived of the privileges of the residents in 
that state.20 Due to these durational residency requirements, the thought of 
having to pay out-of-state tuition rates is often a deterrent to prospective 
students who currently live in one state but are looking to attend a 
university in another state.21 
States impose durational residency requirements for a variety of the 
benefits that they confer upon their citizens, far beyond just imposing them 
through their colleges and universities for their residents to obtain the 
benefit of in-state tuition rates. States have offered a number of reasons for 
imposing these requirements. Oftentimes, states impose them in order to 
ensure that the students paying in-state tuition intend to stay in the state 
indefinitely and are not just coming to the state solely for the purpose of 
securing benefits of the state’s higher education institutions.22 In the context 
of in-state versus out-of-state tuition, these durational residency 
requirements are, in effect, used as a measure to determine whether or not 
the student is a bona fide resident.23 
Case law on the subject of durational residency requirements for 
the purposes of in-state tuition offers insight into other reasons that a state 
will impose them upon nonresidents who want to attend its public 
universities. In Vlandis v. Kline, the state of Connecticut offered three 
different reasons for imposing durational residency requirements on 
students who come into the state to obtain a higher education from a public 
university.24 The first reason offered by Connecticut was that the state has 
an interest in equalizing the cost of public higher education between its 
residents and nonresidents, and that by freezing the student’s residency 
status as of the time the student applied to attend the university, the state is 
ensuring that its bona fide residents will receive their full subsidies.25 This 
is likely the most often-cited reason for states imposing durational 
residency requirements.26 The second reason offered by Connecticut in 
Vlandis was that a state should favor its residents with a lower tuition price 
because residents have contributed a higher tax contribution to the state 
than nonresidents.27 The third reason offered by Connecticut was 
administrative certainty, because the durational residency requirements 
prevent students from coming from out of state solely for in-state tuition 
purposes and then claiming resident status.28 This Note will later discuss in 
                                                 
 20. Id. 
 21. Conlan, supra note 9, at 1389. 
 22. Parent, supra note 6, at 289. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 442, 448-52 (1973). 
 25. Id. at 448. 
 26. Anderson, supra note 3, at 1082-83. 
 27. Vlandis, 412 U.S. at 449. 
 28. Id. at 451. 
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Section V-D whether these reasons are sufficient to overcome the 
discrimination between residents and nonresidents. 
Durational residency requirements place pressure on newer 
residents to stay in the state for a longer period of time before obtaining 
certain state benefits.29 States have imposed these durational residency 
requirements in other areas, such as the receipt of welfare benefits, and 
often do so to reduce the possibility of the fraudulent receipt of state 
benefits.30 States could do this in the same way with residency 
requirements, so as to ensure that actual residents receive the benefit of in-
state tuition. States also often use durational residency requirements for 
voting eligibility, because those who have more established residency will 
often be more informed and care more about the local government, so they 
will make more informed decisions when voting.31 Durational residency 
requirements could incentivize students to become actual residents and 
further contribute to the state economy, which is a major reason that states 
impose them.32 In the context of higher education, states often impose these 
requirements to prevent students from becoming incidental residents as a 
result of their education.33 
States have offered various other reasons why imposing durational 
residency requirements is justified in the context of higher education. 
Higher education is not a fundamental right at the federal level, so state 
universities are not infringing a fundamental right to higher education for 
nonresidents by charging higher tuition prices for residing in the state for a 
lesser period of time.34 States impose them because they do not feel as 
though nonresidents or newer residents are suffering a great harm by having 
to pay a higher price to attend the state’s universities.35 States broadly cite 
tax purposes as justification because residents or their parents pay taxes to 
the state.36 These tax payments ultimately support the state universities, so 
the residents should receive a lower tuition rate.37 In Hooban v. Boling, the 
state of Tennessee offered the reason that the durational residency 
requirements provide a period of time in which the state will assuredly 
receive some benefit for the student’s presence within its borders.38 
Durational residency requirements seem to be a standard method of 
differentiating between bona fide residents of a state and those who come 
                                                 
 29. Erika K. Nelson, Unanswered Questions: The Implications of Saenz v. Roe for 
Durational Residency Requirements, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 193, 196 (2000). 
 30. Bryce Nixon, “Rational Basis with a Bite”: A Retreat from the Constitutional 
Right to Travel, 18 LAW & INEQ. 209, 214 (2000). 
 31. Nelson, supra note 29, at 199. 
 32. Conlan, supra note 9, at 1399. 
 33. In-State Tuition and State Residency Requirements, supra note 10. 
 34. Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 238 (D. Minn. 1970). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Clarke v. Redeker, 259 F. Supp. 117, 123 (S.D. Iowa 1966). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Hooban v. Boling, 503 F.2d 648, 651 (6th Cir. 1974). 
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into the state to attend a public university. They impose further restrictions 
upon whether a student coming from out of state can receive in-state tuition 
than just a typical residency analysis would, because the student has to 
show more than just physical presence and the intent to remain indefinitely; 
the student has to further show that they have been a resident of that state 
for a specified period of time prior to enrollment in the university. In-state 
tuition rates alone are unconstitutional, as discussed in Section III of this 
Note, but the durational residency requirements present an added 
constitutional concern. States may have offered a multitude of reasons 
justifying these types of requirements as necessary, but are these reasons 
sufficient? This Note will answer this question in the negative and analyze 
the constitutional implications of these requirements in Section V. 
II. HISTORY AND SCOPE OF THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE 
OF ARTICLE IV 
In order to determine why durational residency requirements and 
in-state tuition rates violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article 
IV, it is necessary to analyze how this issue fits within the realm of the 
rights protected and granted by the clause. There are two Privileges and 
Immunities Clauses in the United States Constitution, found in Article IV39 
and the Fourteenth Amendment.40 Since they are separate clauses, it is 
necessary to distinguish the two and discuss both for the purposes of this 
Note. In order to do so, this Section will first examine the history, scope, 
and policy of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV to explain 
the roots of the privileges and immunities to which the citizens of the 
United States are entitled, what the clause protects, and how it has been 
interpreted. This Note will discuss the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment in Section IV to examine how the clause 
applies to the states. An examination of the history of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV and the impact of the clause will 
demonstrate how residency requirements for in-state tuition raises 
constitutional concerns within the realm of rights protected and granted as 
privileges and immunities. 
The Privileges and Immunities Clause found in Article IV, Section 
II, Clause I of the United States Constitution plainly states, “The Citizens of 
each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in 
the several States.”41 The Privileges and Immunities Clause does not 
necessarily protect an already-existing right, but instead grants an 
affirmative right to the people of the United States.42 It grants citizens the 
                                                 
 39. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
 40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 41. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
 42. Michael J. Distel, Constitutional Law—Privileges and Immunities Clause—The 
privileges and immunities clause of the United States Constitution protects nonresidents 
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right to the privileges and immunities of the several states, even in the 
absence of commercial activity.43 It is found in the so-called “States’ 
Relations Article” of the Constitution, along with other clauses that grant 
affirmative rights, such as the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Extradition 
Clause, provisions for the admission of new states, the Territory and 
Property Clause, and the Guarantee Clause.44 The Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, in essence, makes it unconstitutional for a state to 
discriminate against nonresidents by treating them as lesser than its own 
residents or not allowing the nonresident to exercise his or her right to the 
privileges and immunities granted to the residents of that particular state.45 
The generally-accepted rationale of the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause is to foster the functioning of a single nation so that citizens will be 
treated the same in each of the several states across the country, regardless 
of their home states.46 The clause does so by balancing “the needs of a 
mobile citizenry” while ensuring that residents of a particular State receive 
what they are entitled to.47 As Justice Field articulated in Paul v. State of 
Virginia, “It was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to place 
the citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens of other 
States, so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those States are 
concerned.”48 Effectively, the Privileges and Immunities Clause acts as an 
Equal Protection Clause for nonresidents.49 The Privileges and Immunities 
Clause does not give nonresidents within a state any greater privileges than 
the residents of the state enjoy, but it does serve to outlaw many statutory 
classifications solely based upon the classification of nonresident status 
within a state.50 The Supreme Court has articulated the purpose of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause to be “to outlaw classifications based on 
the fact of non-citizenship unless there is something to indicate that non-
citizens constitute a particular source of evil at which the statute is 
aimed.”51 
The Supreme Court has not definitively articulated the scope of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause, but courts tend to interpret the clause 
                                                                                                                 
from state actions that discriminate against them unless 1) the protection sought by the 
nonresident is not a guaranteed fundamental right, or 2) the state shows a substantial 
interest justifying different treatment of nonresidents. Supreme Court of Virginia v. 
Friedman, 108 S. Ct. 2260 (1988)., 66 U. DET. L REV. 517, 520 (1989). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 379 (1978). 
 45. Elizabeth Ann Gillis, Constitutional Law—The Privileges and Immunities Clause: 
A Strengthened Standard with a Clarified Analysis—Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. 
Piper, 105 S. Ct. 1272 (1985)., 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 93, 93 (1986). 
 46. Dorean Marguerite Koenig, One Nation Undivided . . . , 22 U. TOL. L. REV. 737, 
740 (1991). 
 47. Id. at 742. 
 48. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1868). 
 49. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 794 (2009). 
 50. Id. at 239-40. 
 51. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S 385, 398 (1948). 
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broadly.52 The scope of the Privileges and Immunities Clause has been 
interpreted both as a blanket form of protection for the fundamental rights 
of all citizens and a case-by-case analysis of whether there has been an 
infringement of a particular right that the plaintiff asserts. 53 Although the 
scope of the Privileges and Immunities Clause is often construed broadly, 
the Supreme Court has articulated some restrictions on the scope of the 
clause. The clause only protects the privileges and immunities that affect 
the vitality of the United States as a single nation for residents and 
nonresidents.54 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has consistently held that 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not protect any actions that the 
courts find are related to the political operation of the sovereign state.55 
In determining what fits within the realm of the rights afforded and 
protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Supreme Court 
oftentimes must determine what is best for the nation as a single entity by 
balancing both unity interests at a federal level as well as state interests.56 
Once the Supreme Court determines that a particular right or privilege falls 
within the scope of the protections afforded by the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, that right or privilege is protected under the clause in 
future cases.57 The activity or classification in question must be 
“sufficiently basic to the livelihood in the Nation . . . as to fall within the 
purview of the Privileges and Immunities Clause[.]”58 This ties into the 
clause’s generally-accepted rationale being the fostering of a single nation, 
because if the questioned activity or classification does not relate to this 
goal, it does not fall within the purview of the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause. The Supreme Court will invalidate a restriction that deprives 
nonresidents of a protected privilege only if it determines that the restriction 
does not advance a substantial state interest.59 
The modern interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
that courts use in their analyses is rooted in the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Toomer v. Witsell.60 At issue in that case were South Carolina statutes 
related to shrimping within a three-mile belt off of South Carolina’s coast.61 
The Supreme Court struck down a statute that required nonresidents of the 
state of South Carolina to pay a higher license fee than what residents had 
to pay for each shrimp boat used within the three-mile belt.62 The Supreme 
                                                 
 52. Distel, supra note 42, at 520. 
 53. Gillis, supra note 45, at 95. 
 54. Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 279 (1985). 
 55. Gillis, supra note 45, at 95. 
 56. Koenig, supra note 46, at 745. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 64-65 (1988) (quoting United 
Bldg. & Const. Trades Council v. City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 209 (1984)). 
 59. Id. at 65. 
 60. Distel, supra note 42, at 521. 
 61. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S 385, 389 (1948). 
 62. Id. at 403. 
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Court’s decision in Toomer recognized that the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause is not absolute, however.63 The Supreme Court determined that 
South Carolina had the power to regulate the three-mile belt because South 
Carolina had a legitimate state interest in the fishery within three miles off 
its coast, so it could exercise its police power to regulate it.64 This decision 
showed that laws implemented due to state policy concerns, may, in the 
process of remedying those concerns, sometimes result in discrimination 
against nonresidents.65 However, any discriminatory practices that occur as 
result of a change in laws must bear a close relationship to the state’s 
objective in implementing the law.66 The Supreme Court also articulated 
that the primary purpose of the Privileges and Immunities Clause is to help 
fuse the independent states into a collective nation,67 which lends more 
credence to the notion that the clause only reaches those actions that have 
an effect on the nation as a single entity. 
Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission of Montana gave a further 
enumeration of rights protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 
articulating that the clause protects fundamental rights.68 Nonresidents had 
to pay higher hunting license fees, and the state placed limitations on the 
amount of elk and deer that the nonresidents could hunt.69 The Supreme 
Court declined to extend the protection of the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause to recreational hunting.70 Because the right to engage in recreational 
activities is not a fundamental right, it is not worthy of the clause’s 
protection.71 The Supreme Court reasoned that the license fees did not 
deprive the nonresidents of a means of livelihood, and since access to 
Montana elk was not “basic to the maintenance or well-being of the 
Union,” the claims were not within the purview of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause.72 This decision in Baldwin further bolstered the notion 
that distinctions between residents and nonresidents will be prohibited 
when they hinder the “formation, the purpose, or the development of a 
single Union of [the] States.”73 
In Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman, a nonresident was 
unable to practice law in a state in which she was not a resident.74 The State 
of Virginia claimed that its ability to function as a sovereign political entity 
would be compromised if it could not exclude nonresidents from the state 
                                                 
 63. Distel, supra note 42, at 521; Toomer, 334 U.S. at 396. 
 64. Toomer, 334 U.S. at 393. 
 65. Distel, supra note 42, at 521. 
 66. Gillis, supra note 45, at 96. 
 67. Toomer, 334 U.S. at 395. 
 68. Distel, supra note 42, at 522. 
 69. Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 373 (1978). 
 70. Id. at 388. 
 71. Gillis, supra note 45, at 97. 
 72. Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 388. 
 73. Id. at 383. 
 74. Distel, supra note 42, at 525. 
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bar.75 The Supreme Court broadened the scope of the clause’s protections 
by stating that nonresidents do not have to be entirely excluded from the 
state as a whole in order for the protections of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause to apply.76 The Supreme Court determined that the 
denial of the nonresident’s right to practice law within the state of Virginia 
was within the purview of the protections afforded by the clause because 
the practice of law is basic enough to the national economy to be deemed a 
privilege that the clause protects.77 
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV affords 
invaluable rights to the citizens of the United States. It ensures that people 
will be treated as equals regardless of which state they are in, and it keeps 
the several states from being able to discriminate against someone who 
comes into the state from a foreign state. With the clause being interpreted 
broadly, citizens can enjoy a multitude of privileges and immunities in each 
of the several states. The Privileges and Immunities Clause also confers a 
benefit upon the United States as a whole because it promotes the 
fashioning of a single, working nation. The right to enjoy the privileges and 
immunities of the citizens of the several states applies to the states through 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as 
well, as this Note will discuss in Section IV. Moving forward from the 
history and background of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article 
IV, this Note will now analyze in Section III why the practice of 
differentiating between in-state and out-of-state tuition rates for residents 
and nonresidents violates this clause. 
III. WHY IN-STATE TUITION RATES VIOLATE THE PRIVILEGES AND 
IMMUNITIES CLAUSE OF ARTICLE IV 
As discussed in Section II of this Note, the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause is found in Article IV of the United States Constitution. 
Although this Note primarily argues later in Section V that durational 
residency requirements violate the right to travel under the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause found within the Fourteenth Amendment, in-state tuition 
rates also violate the clause found within Article IV. In-state tuition rates 
violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV for two primary 
reasons: (A) treating students who come into a state to obtain a higher 
education the same as students who remain in the state in which they 
already live bears upon the unity of the Nation as a whole, and (B) the 
clause prevents states from treating anyone differently, no matter who they 
are and regardless of whether they came from a different state or not. 
                                                 
 75. Gillis, supra note 45, at 97. 
 76. Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 66 (1988). 
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A. The Unity of the Nation as a Whole 
The purpose of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Article IV 
is to place the citizens of each state on equal footing with citizens of other 
states, at least as far as advantages resulting from citizenship in that 
particular state are concerned.78 The clause in Article IV commands that 
states treat all citizens, residents and nonresidents, equally, primarily with 
respect to those privileges and immunities “bearing upon the vitality of the 
Nation as a single entity[.]”79 The clause aids the vitality of the Nation as a 
single entity because the enjoyment of privileges and immunities by 
citizens of one state who go into another state serves the purpose of 
perpetuating “mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the 
different states of the Union.”80 
Treating a student who comes into the state for the purpose of 
obtaining a higher education differently from a student who has resided in 
the state for an extended period of time by charging the former student a 
much higher price tag on that education fails to perpetuate a mutual 
friendship among the people of the United States. This bears upon the 
vitality of the Nation as a single entity by preventing students from leaving 
their own states to receive an education in another state because they are 
aware that they will be treated differently in the new state. This seems to 
perpetuate a system of states operating individually and not as a collective 
whole or single entity. Depriving nonresidents of the privilege of in-state 
tuition could ultimately deprive them of the opportunity to receive a higher 
education in that state completely due to high costs of out-of-state tuition. 
The deprivation of education triggers strict judicial scrutiny, particularly 
when the deprivation results from the inability to pay for the education.81 
Furthermore, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV 
was intended to foster the vitality of the Nation as a whole by also creating 
a national economic union.82 The clause achieves this purpose by 
guaranteeing to a citizen of one state the right to do business in another 
state on substantially equal terms as those citizens already in the other 
state.83 For example, the Supreme Court of the United States said in 
Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper that New Hampshire’s practice 
of excluding nonresidents from its state bar association violated the clause 
in Article IV because the profession bore upon the national economy and 
the state powers entrusted to lawyers do not “involve matters of state policy 
or acts of such unique responsibility as to entrust them only to citizens.”84 
                                                 
 78. Id. at 64. 
 79. United Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council v. City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 218 
(1984) (quoting Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371 (1978)). 
 80. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1823). 
 81. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 209 (1982). 
 82. Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 279-80 (1985). 
 83. Id. 280. 
 84. Id. at 283 (quoting In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 724 (1973)). 
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The practice of law holds significant importance in the national economy 
because, as the Supreme Court noted, “the activities of lawyers play an 
important part in commercial intercourse.” 85 
The fostering of a national economic union under the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV is not without its limits, however. Citizens 
of the several states are not permitted to participate in all of the rights that 
the citizens of that state enjoy under the guise of fostering a national 
economic union.86 Nonresidents may not, for example, deplete bodies of 
water or property in foreign states of wildlife for commercial purposes and 
claim that it violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV for 
the state to force them to stop.87 The property belongs to individuals of the 
state as much as it belongs to the state itself, and the state can protect the 
property against aggressions from nonresidents.88 The right to enjoy the 
privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states does not amount 
to a grant of co-tenancy in the state’s common property to nonresidents.89 
Most notably, education provides citizens with the tools to help 
lead economically productive lives that can ultimately benefit us all.90 
Education plays a vital role in our free society91 because the education that 
citizens receive can lead them on to create new inventions and foster new 
ideas, which will serve to benefit the Nation as a whole. All states offer 
public higher education, so it is not of such “unique responsibility” that 
states should attempt to attract only longtime residents by offering them a 
much lower rate of tuition. Education is an important state service, and 
denying in-state tuition to citizens who wish to attend a particular university 
within that state presents a large hurdle to obtaining that service.92 With 
tuition costs ever-rising, it may come to a point that only wealthy 
individuals can attend schools in different states.93 That has quite the 
opposite effect from fostering a national economic union because it isolates 
those who are not in a wealthier portion of the population and deprives 
them of the opportunity to attend school in another state and ultimately join 
the national economy in a field of their choice.94 Further, offering the same 
tuition rate to nonresidents that citizens receive does not rise to the level of 
creating a co-tenancy in the common property of the state. Residents and 
nonresidents alike would have the same opportunities at the same tuition 
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rate, which assists in states working together rather than competing with 
each other in the field of higher education. This fosters a national economic 
union, which bears upon the vitality of the Nation as a whole. 
B. All Citizens Must be Treated the Same Regardless 
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, by its plain 
language, prevents a state from treating anyone differently, whomever they 
are. The Privileges and Immunities Clause embraces the right of a citizen to 
pass through or reside in any other state for essentially any purpose.95 Even 
if viewed from the perspective that a state university is not depriving 
nonresidents of the opportunity to obtain a higher education within its 
borders by charging the nonresidents a higher price for tuition, the state 
cannot treat those nonresidents differently. Offering in-state tuition rates to 
residents confers a privilege upon them that nonresidents do not receive, 
which is a violation of the mandates of the clause. Education plays a 
fundamental role in the maintenance of the fabric of society in the United 
States.96 The acquisition of knowledge and education has been a long-term 
matter of supreme importance in American society, and public schools are 
the primary vehicle for transmitting knowledge.97 By charging a higher 
tuition price tag for nonresidents, states effectively cause that vehicle to 
stop short, keeping many American citizens in their own states and 
preventing them from gaining knowledge elsewhere. States should not 
afford different treatment to individuals unless there is a relevant distinction 
among them.98 
Though citizens of the several states are not entitled to all of the 
rights granted to the citizens of a particular state, citizens of the several 
states have the right to the enjoyment of life and liberty and the right to 
pursue and obtain happiness in foreign states.99 Citizens of the several states 
have the right under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV to 
pass through or reside in another state for purposes of their professional 
pursuits or otherwise.100 Forcing citizens of the several states to pay out-of-
state tuition rates deprives them of these rights for no reason other than 
their citizenship in another state. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV is designed to put citizens of one state on equal footing with 
those citizens of other states, “so far as the advantages resulting from 
citizenship in those States are concerned.”101 Differences in tuition prices 
place nonresidents on far from equal footing from residents, depriving them 
                                                 
 95. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1823). 
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of the significant advantage that an in-state tuition rate provides. Giving 
residents the benefit of paying lower prices for tuition keeps nonresidents 
from feeling welcome in other states for higher education purposes, which 
both weakens the vitality of the Nation as a single entity and directly 
violates the requirement of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article 
IV that a state not treat nonresidents as lesser than residents. 
IV. THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT AND THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL 
The way in which the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article 
IV affords protection to United States citizens provides an important 
backdrop to how states afford these protections to citizens through the 
Fourteenth Amendment. This Note’s primary argument is couched in the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
particularly in the right to travel. The language of the clause in the 
Fourteenth Amendment states, “No state shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States[.]”102 The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment grants certain fundamental rights to the people, and the 
fundamental right to travel is of most importance to this Note. Therefore, 
this Section will first briefly discuss the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and then provide a history and analysis of the 
right to travel. 
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment provides each United States citizen with an understanding and 
appreciation that states cannot abridge his or her privileges and 
immunities.103 This means, essentially, that the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment affords protection against 
discrimination on the basis of nonresident status directly to all citizens by 
keeping each state from being able to withhold privileges or immunities 
granted to residents of a state from nonresidents of a state. American 
citizens have the opportunity to enjoy privileges and immunities from all 
states, and no one state can abridge them.104 There is a distinction between 
the citizenship to the United States and the citizenship to the individual 
state, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not serve to protect a citizen of a state against his or her 
own state’s legislative power.105 In turn, through the use of the words 
“privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,” it serves to 
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prevent states from treating United States citizens who are also citizens of 
foreign states differently than that states treat their own citizens.106 
The Supreme Court of the United States adopted a definition for 
“the privileges and immunities of citizens” in The Slaughter-House Cases, 
as it had previously been unclear to the Court what fundamental principles 
the clause protected.107 The privileges and immunities protected by the 
clause are often viewed as the rights belonging to individuals as citizens of 
states and are “held to be the class of rights which the State governments 
were created to establish and secure.”108 The Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not create the right of the 
individual to enjoy the privileges and immunities of the several states and 
did not act as a mechanism to control how states measure the rights of its 
own citizens.109 The clause declares to the several states that, regardless of 
what rights they choose to grant to their citizens or how they limit or 
qualify those rights, the states must grant the same rights in the same 
capacity to those citizens of the several states who come into that state.110 
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment preserves the right of a newly-arrived citizen in a state to enjoy 
the same privileges and immunities enjoyed by citizens of that state.111 
When looking at state actions that discriminate against a newly-arrived 
citizen because the citizen has been domiciled within the state for less than 
a year, for example, a higher standard of review must be used than mere 
rationality or an intermediate standard due to the discriminatory nature of 
the action.112 Particularly, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects citizens from this kind of discriminatory 
behavior by granting United States citizens the right to travel, which is 
protected by the newly-arrived person’s status as both a citizen of a state 
and a United States citizen.113 This Note argues that durational residency 
requirements for in-state tuition purposes violate the right to travel. The full 
discussion of that argument is found in Section V. This Section will now 
provide a foundation on the right to travel from which to argue. 
In determining that residency requirements for tuition purposes fall 
within the purview of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, these requirements must affect the fashioning of a 
                                                 
 106. Id. (emphasis removed). 
 107. Id. at 76 (“What these fundamental principles are, it would be more tedious than 
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 111. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501 (1999). 
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single nation.114 The right to travel, though not explicitly stated anywhere in 
the Constitution,115 has been recognized by the Supreme Court as a basic 
right granted to the people under the Constitution.116 The right to travel 
affects the fashioning of a single nation because the Supreme Court has 
recognized that the United States’ nature and concepts of personal liberty 
“unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and 
breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which 
unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.”117 
As early as 1920, in United States v. Wheeler, the Supreme Court 
declared the right to travel to be a fundamental right.118 This decision has 
been upheld since, notably in Shapiro v. Thompson in 1966 and Saenz v. 
Roe in 1992.119 Since the right to travel is a fundamental right, courts must 
apply strict scrutiny to any violations of and infringements upon this 
right.120 As Justice Stewart stated in his concurring opinion in Shapiro v. 
Thompson, “[I]t is a virtually unconditional personal right, guaranteed by 
the Constitution to us all.”121 In Saenz v. Roe, the Supreme Court articulated 
three components that the right to travel protects: 
[T]he right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave 
another State, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor 
rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in 
the second State, and, for those travelers who elect to 
become permanent residents, the right to be treated like 
other citizens of that State.122 
The right to travel fits within the purview of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as the Supreme Court 
noted in Saenz v. Roe.123 The Supreme Court further stated that the right to 
travel under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment embraces the third component of the right to travel, which is 
the citizen’s right to be treated equally in his or her new state of 
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residence.124 Any discriminatory classification that hinders this right 
confers a penalty on the traveling citizen’s right to travel.125 
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Zobel v. Williams 
indicates that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment has long been associated with interstate travel.126 Justice 
O’Connor drew the roots of the Privileges and Immunities Clause to Article 
IV of the Articles of Confederation, which guaranteed the inhabitants of the 
free states “[the] privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several 
States.”127 Article IV of the Articles of Confederation also recognized a 
right of “free ingress and regress to and from any other State.”128 Justice 
O’Connor’s comparison between the Privileges and Immunities Clause and 
Article IV of the Articles of Confederation shows that the right to travel has 
historically been linked to the protections afforded by the guarantee of the 
right to the privileges and immunities of citizens of several states. 
The Supreme Court has noted that the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right of a citizen of one 
state to travel into another state, establish residence there, and enjoy the 
privileges and immunities afforded to the residents already living in the 
state.129 The right to travel fits within the protections afforded by the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause because it protects the right of citizens to 
travel among the several states and be free from discrimination or denial of 
a state’s privileges and immunities on the basis of their nonresident status. 
Residency requirements for in-state tuition relate to the right to travel 
because students will often travel from their home state to another with the 
objective of attending a college or university in that new state. 
V. IMPOSING DURATIONAL RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS ON 
NONRESIDENT STUDENTS VIOLATES THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 
CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
Giving lower tuition rates using arbitrary classifications among 
residents through the use of durational residency requirements, although 
widely practiced among the several states, is unconstitutional under the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This 
Section of this Note argues that the practice infringes upon the right to 
interstate travel and violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment for the following reasons: (A) students who go into 
a new state for the purpose of establishing residency and attending school 
there should retain the right to be treated like citizens of that state under the 
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right to travel; (B) classifying new resident students as “nonresidents” 
creates a discriminatory classification; (C) durational residency 
requirements create a distinction between students who have lived in the 
state for a shorter amount of time and students who have lived in the state 
for a longer amount of time by depriving the shorter term residents of the 
privilege of in-state tuition; and (D) states must present a compelling state 
interest for infringing on the right to travel, and the Supreme Court has 
consistently struck down the reasons that states have offered for doing so. 
The Supreme Court has not clearly addressed whether residency 
requirements for tuition purposes are unconstitutional,130 but this Note 
argues that they are and that the practice should be evaluated. 
A violation of the right to travel is relevant to an analysis of 
durational residency requirements because these requirements can force a 
deprivation of the privilege of in-state tuition rates when a student travels 
into another state to attend a university, especially when the student has the 
intent to remain in that new state indefinitely. The right to travel is a 
fundamental right, and “any classification which serves to penalize the 
exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a 
compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional.”131 To briefly revisit 
what the right to travel entails, it affords protection to a citizen’s right to 
enter and leave other states, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor in 
the other several states, and the right to be treated like citizens of a 
particular state when a nonresident elects to establish residency in a new 
state.132 
A. The Right of a New Resident to be Treated the Same as Long-Term 
Residents 
First, primarily at issue for purposes of in-state tuition residency 
requirements is the third component of the protections that the right to 
travel affords. The right to travel grants travelers who elect to become 
permanent residents of a new state the right to be treated like other citizens 
of the state.133 Students have the ability to leave their home states and enter 
into a new state in order to attend a university in that new state. If the 
student is physically present in the state and has the intent to remain there 
indefinitely, the student has fulfilled the requirements for bona fide 
residency.134 
However, if the student had not been a resident of that state for the 
time period specified by the durational residency requirement prior to 
enrollment in the university, the student would not be able to enjoy in-state 
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tuition prices. This puts the durational residency requirements in conflict 
with the right to travel because the state treats these students differently 
from those who had been residents for the specified time period, even 
though they all may be bona fide residents regardless. Even if the state 
offers a reason for depriving the nonresident of a privilege, there is no 
authority that makes it acceptable for the state to qualify the protection of 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause for a citizen of one state who goes 
into another state to settle there.135 The Court has stated that it is “common 
ground” for the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to protect this component of the right to travel because newly-
arrived citizens have the right to enjoy the same privileges and immunities 
already enjoyed by citizens of the state.136 
Allowing state universities to use durational residency requirements 
for the purpose of tuition rates gives the universities quite a bit of leeway 
around the protections of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. If a newer resident who came into the state to 
attend school can offer proof that he or she intends to remain in that state 
upon graduation, the university could simply find that it was unconvinced 
and choose to classify that student as a nonresident anyway just based upon 
the length of time that student had already been in the state.137 If a newer 
resident came into a state and immediately enrolled in a university, it would 
be difficult, if not impossible, for that student to be able to prove to the 
satisfaction of the university that they are a bona fide resident, regardless of 
any intent to remain indefinitely.138 Out-of-state tuition imposes costs on 
new residents and nonresidents that are far higher than those imposed on 
residents, which penalizes those new residents that have exercised their 
right to travel.139 
B. Discriminatory Classifications Burden Freedom to Travel 
Second, since the right to travel includes the right of the citizen to 
be treated equal to how the established residents are treated in his or her 
new state of residence, calling these new residents nonresidents because of 
the durational residency requirements creates a discriminatory 
classification.140 This discriminatory classification, by itself, is a penalty on 
the new resident’s right to travel, because it keeps the new resident from 
being able to enjoy the same privileges and immunities as those citizens of 
the state that meet the durational residency requirement.141 These 
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discriminatory classifications are penalties on the right to travel regardless 
of the severity with which the classifications actually affect the right to 
travel.142 
Conversely, in Starns v. Malkerson, the United States District Court 
for the District of Minnesota, Fourth Division held that durational residency 
requirements for in-state tuition do not violate the right to travel.143 The 
court reasoned that there were not sufficient facts alleged to determine that 
the state’s one-year durational residency requirement had a specific 
objective of excluding out-of-state students from attending the state’s 
universities.144 Since the court found that the durational residency 
requirement did not have the effect of excluding out-of-state students, the 
court held that the requirement had no chilling effect on the right to 
travel.145 The court further held that, since there was no infringement upon 
the right to travel, the state did not have to present a compelling state 
interest for imposing these durational residency requirements.146 
However, this holding is too narrow, because it ignores those 
students who come into the state with the intent to remain there post-
graduation from a state university. Those students would still have to pay 
out-of-state tuition due to the durational residency requirements, and that 
could ultimately deter a student from traveling into another state and 
attending a university of his or her choice in that state. Just because a 
durational residency requirement does not have a sweeping exclusionary 
effect on out-of-state students does not mean that it does not impose a 
burden on out-of-state students who wish to attend a state university. It also 
does not mean that these out-of-state students are not deprived of the 
privilege of in-state tuition, especially in the case of out-of-state students 
who intend to remain in that state after graduating. As Judge East stated in 
his dissent in Sturgis v. State of Washington, “This freedom to travel is not 
limited to a mere directional concept or act of interstate commerce but 
embraces the fundamental right of an individual to go about in his own 
individualistic pursuit of happiness, and receive equal treatment under the 
laws of a given state.”147 
C. Distinctions Among Residents 
Third, durational residency requirements deprive out-of-state 
students who intend to remain in the state of the privileges afforded to 
residents of the state by creating a distinction between different classes of 
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residents. By creating a distinction between newer residents and older 
residents, these students who come from other states are not allowed to 
enjoy the privilege of in-state tuition solely because they have not been 
residents for as long as other students have been. One particular 
justification offered by states for creating this distinction through the 
imposition of durational residency requirements is that the requirements 
keep nonresidents from coming into the state for the purpose of obtaining 
benefits that they could not receive in their home states. This justification 
falls short because states cannot create a distinction among residents based 
upon the notion that some residents are somehow less worthy of benefits 
based upon the length of time they have been in the state. The in-migration 
of nonresidents who just want to reap state benefits is a constitutionally 
impermissible justification.148 This justification is unconstitutional because 
it promotes a classification among residents, allowing some residents to 
enjoy privileges that other residents do not get to enjoy.149 The distinctions 
created by these durational residency requirements are overinclusive 
because they effectively bar all bona fide residents who applied from out of 
state from ever being considered bona fide residents.150 This is because the 
student’s predominant purpose for being in the state, even if that student is 
a bona fide resident, is to attend a university.151 
For example, in Shapiro v. Thompson, there was a state statutory 
provision that denied welfare assistance to residents if they had not lived in 
the state for at least one year immediately prior to their applications for 
assistance.152 The Supreme Court reasoned that this justification implied 
that people who come into the state hoping to secure higher welfare 
assistance benefits for themselves and their families were somehow less 
deserving than those who came into the state for other reasons.153 The 
Supreme Court stated, “But we do not perceive why a mother who is 
seeking to make a new life for herself and her children should be regarded 
as less deserving because she considers, among other factors, the level of a 
State’s public assistance.”154 
This same reasoning can be applied to durational residency 
requirements being used to keep out-of-state students from coming into a 
state solely for the purpose of attending a university in that state. If a 
student comes into a state for the purpose of attending a state university, 
why should that student receive any different treatment from the state than a 
student who moved to the state due to a marriage (or any other reason) and 
had just moved there over a year prior to enrollment at a university? 
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Deciding where to obtain a higher education is a very important decision in 
an individual’s life, and there is no justifiable reason to treat a student as 
less of a resident just because they came to the state to attend school. In 
Shapiro, however, the Supreme Court withheld judgment on durational 
residency requirements in any areas other than welfare benefits.155 
Penalizing those who have gone from one state to another during 
the qualifying period of a durational residency requirement further creates a 
distinction among residents by treating people differently just because they 
have exercised their right to travel into the state more recently than others 
may have. This distinction is baseless, as there should be no blanket 
determination that someone has less intent to be a permanent resident of the 
state than another just because the newer resident has not been in the state 
for quite as long. What if the durational residency requirement is one year, 
and one student has to pay out-of-state tuition because he or she has only 
lived in the state for eleven months while another student gets to pay in-
state tuition because he or she has lived in the state for thirteen months? 
The former student should not have to pay a higher price tag for exercising 
his right to travel into the state two months later than the latter student. 
For example, in Dunn v. Blumstein, the state of Tennessee imposed 
durational residency requirements on the right to vote in the state.156 The 
Supreme Court held that these durational residency requirements directly 
infringe upon the fundamental right to travel.157 The Court reasoned that 
these requirements did so because they classified bona fide residents on the 
basis of their recent travel into the state and penalized those “who have 
gone from one jurisdiction to another during the qualifying period.”158 Even 
if these requirements did not actually deter newer residents from voting in 
Tennessee, actual deterrence is not the basis for determining whether the 
durational residency requirements impose a penalty on the right to travel.159 
These durational residency requirements singled out those residents who 
had more recently exercised their right to travel within the specified time 
period and, in doing so, directly penalized them.160 
These durational residency requirements in Dunn forced those who 
wished to travel or change their states of residency to choose between their 
right to travel and their right to be able to vote in the state of Tennessee, 
and the state cannot burden the right to travel without a compelling state 
interest.161 Even though education is not recognized as a fundamental 
right,162 an individual’s education can be of such great importance to him or 
her that the prospect of paying higher tuition prices would force him or her 
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to choose between getting an education at the school of his or her choice 
and exercising his or her right to travel. Regardless of whether the student’s 
access to education at a certain state university is infringed upon, the 
student’s right to travel would be infringed upon by these durational 
residency requirements. Constitutional rights hold little to no value if they 
can be denied or infringed upon.163 Students should not have to choose 
between obtaining the protections afforded by the right to interstate travel 
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause and attending the university 
which would provide them with the most beneficial education simply 
because they decided to change their state of residence within a specified 
time period. Further, durational residency requirements can create a 
distinction among residents by depriving them of a state benefit even if that 
state benefit does not constitute a fundamental right. 
The right to travel has extended to other benefits and rights that are 
not fundamental.164 Although education may not be classified as a 
fundamental right at the federal level, obtaining a higher education at a 
lower cost is a benefit conferred by states upon residents for which United 
States citizens should be allowed to exercise their right to travel. In 
Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, the right to travel extended to 
the denial of the benefit of civil service employment.165 The Supreme Court 
stated, “While the benefit sought here may not rise to the same level of 
importance as the necessities of life and the right to vote, it is 
unquestionably substantial.”166 Therefore, the right to travel can extend and 
has extended beyond rights that are fundamental or basic necessities of life. 
Although higher education is not a fundamental right,167 and arguably may 
not be a basic necessity of life, it still holds a high level of importance to all 
individuals and to the country as a whole. Certainly it holds a level of 
importance similar to the benefit of civil service employment. If the 
Supreme Court has been willing to extend the coverage of the right to travel 
to that area to avoid distinctions among residents,168 it follows that 
obtaining the benefit of a higher education at a lower cost falls within the 
same coverage. 
D. Unsatisfactory State Justifications 
Fourth, if a durational residency requirement creates a classification 
among residents that ultimately serves to penalize the right to travel for any 
residents who have not been in the state for at least the period of time 
specified by the requirement, that classification triggers the compelling 
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state interest test.169 To meet this test, the state must provide a compelling 
state interest as justification for imposing these durational residency 
requirements that infringe upon the newer residents’ right to travel.170 Since 
the right to travel is found under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the 
compelling state interest must affect the vitality of the Nation as a single 
entity.171 
The compelling state interest test is necessary only when there is 
evidence to indicate that there is an infringement upon a fundamental right, 
such as the right to travel.172 Since public education is not a fundamental 
right at the federal level,173 placing limitations on the ability of these new 
residents to attend public universities by charging out-of-state tuition does 
not trigger the compelling interest test in this circumstance. It is the 
infringement upon the right to travel of those nonresident students who 
come into a state to attend a public university that triggers the compelling 
interest test. Courts have held that durational residency requirements should 
be viewed under strict scrutiny, thus creating the need for the compelling 
state interest test, even when the right or the benefit denied is not essential 
to one’s survival.174 The right to travel may not be essential to the 
nonresident student’s survival, but any infringement upon that right 
necessitates the compelling state interest test regardless, so the compelling 
state interest test is applicable here. 
From another perspective, it may be argued as a justification for 
differentiating between residents and nonresidents that durational residency 
requirements only incidentally burden the right to travel, and that since the 
practice of charging in-state tuition may not seem to directly infringe upon 
a fundamental right, the compelling state interest test is not necessary. 
However, the Supreme Court held in Saenz v. Roe that any “[p]ermissible 
justifications” for discrimination between residents and nonresidents are 
wholly inapplicable to a nonresident’s exercise of his or her right to move 
into a new state and establish domicile there.175 Saenz concerned a 
California statute that limited the amount of welfare benefits that would be 
available to new residents.176 The statute provided that, for the first year a 
new resident lives in California, they were only permitted to receive the 
welfare benefits they received in their prior state of residence, thus 
deterring nonresidents from moving into California to obtain greater 
welfare benefits.177 The plaintiffs challenged the durational residency 
                                                 
 169. Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 258 (1974). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 279 (1985). 
 172. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 334 (1972). 
 173. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). 
 174. Chartier, supra note 92, at 590. 
 175. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502 (1999). 
 176. Id. at 492. 
 177. Id. 
304 BELMONT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:1: 1 
requirement because it violated the right to travel into California and obtain 
the privileges California conferred upon its longtime residents.178 
In Saenz, California argued that its cost-saving benefits from the 
enactment of this statute were a compelling state interest179 and that, 
because the new residents were not made wholly ineligible for welfare 
benefits during their first year of residency, the statute did not penalize the 
right to travel.180 The Supreme Court did not accept these reasons from 
California and held that the right to travel ensures the right to be treated 
equally in your new state of residence regardless of the length of time spent 
physically present in that state.181 The state of California tried to argue that 
the welfare scheme only burdened the right to travel “incidentally,” so that 
was not of issue.182 However, the Supreme Court responded that since the 
durational residency requirements discriminated against newer residents, 
the discriminatory classification itself was a penalty on the right to travel 
and a violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.183 
Durational residency requirements for in-state tuition rates burden 
the right to travel in the same way that the durational residency 
requirements for welfare benefits burdened the right to travel in Saenz. 
Regardless of whether a state seems to only be “incidentally” burdening the 
fundamental right to travel, these residency requirements create 
discriminatory classifications that penalize the right of a citizen of one state 
to move into another and establish residency there to attend a public 
institution of higher education. The discriminatory classification is itself an 
infringement of the right to travel, which is a fundamental right protected 
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.184 These durational residency requirements penalize students 
solely because they come from a different state or came from a different 
state more recently than others, and this in turn impinges upon their right to 
travel. Where a state has undertaken to provide an opportunity for public 
education, that opportunity must be provided to all within the state on equal 
terms.185 
States have offered a number of other interests to justify the 
imposition of durational residency requirements. A primary reason offered 
is that the state has an interest in equalizing the cost of public higher 
education between residents and nonresidents so that the state can ensure 
that the bona fide residents receive their full subsidies.186 This reason 
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ignores the fact that a student can still be a bona fide resident of the state 
even though he originally applied to the university from a different state. 
Therefore, the durational residency requirements really only ensure that 
some bona fide residents will receive their full subsidies and not others, 
with students from foreign states not being able to receive their full 
subsidies while attending the university.187 The Supreme Court rejected this 
reason in Vlandis v. Kline as a compelling interest of the state, finding this 
reasoning wholly unrelated to the objective of cost equalization between 
residents and nonresidents.188 Furthermore, courts have generally held that 
cost equalization is not a compelling state interest that justifies durational 
residency requirements.189 
States also claim that it is permissible to favor longer-term residents 
with a lower tuition rate because the long-term residents had contributed 
higher tax contributions to the state than the nonresidents or newer 
residents, so the long-term residents should get the benefit of in-state 
tuition.190 This kind of reasoning just perpetuates arbitrary classifications 
between more established residents and newer residents. The state cannot 
classify newer residents as nonresidents when their residency is equal to 
that of more established residents in all facets apart from the length of 
residency.191 The Supreme Court rejected this reason in Vlandis as well, 
determining that this kind of reasoning is not sound because it creates a 
distinction between “established” residents and “new” residents.192 The 
Supreme Court reinforced this reasoning and demonstrated how it violated 
the right to travel in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County by stating, 
“The conservation of the taxpayers’ purse is simply not a sufficient state 
interest to sustain a durational residence requirement which, in effect, 
severely penalizes exercise of the right to freely migrate and settle in 
another State.”193 
States also claim that durational residency requirements ensure 
administrative certainty because the requirements make it easier for the 
state to keep students from coming into the state solely to attend a 
university and claiming residency status just to get in-state tuition.194 
Administrative certainty should not be an acceptable reason to discriminate 
amongst residents. A student who comes into a state to attend a university 
there, especially with the intention of staying in that state after graduating, 
should not have to pay a much higher tuition price tag simply to aid in 
administrative certainty. The Supreme Court also rejected this reason as a 
compelling state interest in Vlandis, because administrative certainty is not 
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a proper justification for creating classifications among residents.195 The 
Supreme Court re-articulated its statement from Stanley v. Illinois that “the 
Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.”196 
States have denied benefits and justified an imposition on the right 
to travel in other contexts, such as welfare benefits, by claiming that 
durational residency requirements help maintain the fiscal integrity of state 
programs by giving the benefits to residents because of their tax 
contributions to the state.197 Even though a state may have a compelling 
state interest in maintaining the fiscal integrity of its higher education 
programs and schools, it does not constitutionally further this interest by 
creating classes of citizens that distinguish between newer residents coming 
into the state to attend school and residents who have been in the state for a 
longer period of time. The Supreme Court conceded in Shapiro v. 
Thompson that the state does have an interest in maintaining the fiscal 
integrity of the programs it offers, but still the Court maintained that the 
state may not accomplish this interest by creating classifications among its 
residents.198 Since the limitation of welfare benefits to those citizens who 
contributed more in taxes to the state was not regarded as a constitutional 
means of furthering a compelling state interest in Shapiro,199 it follows that 
this reasoning can also be applied to durational residency requirements for 
tuition purposes. 
States often impose durational residency requirements for tuition 
purposes in an effort to keep students from moving into the state to obtain 
the benefit of in-state tuition and fraudulently claiming residency status to 
“game the system.”200 This reasoning ignores that there could be plenty of 
students from out of state who come into the state for other reasons, such as 
family or marriage, and do intend to remain in that state upon graduation or 
at least for the foreseeable future. In this circumstance, durational residency 
requirements put all of these out-of-state students into one category. The 
Supreme Court has rejected this type of reasoning as being wholly 
overinclusive, since some people could have moved into the state for 
purposes other than obtaining benefits but would still be denied those 
benefits if they did not meet the durational residency requirement.201 This 
particular reasoning effectively just lumps all in-migrants into one category 
that makes it seem as though all of them came into the state for this sole 
purpose, when many of them may not have.202 
Denying students who come into a state and attend a university 
there the privilege of in-state tuition through the use of durational residency 
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requirements is unconstitutional because it infringes on the right to travel, 
and thus contravenes the Privileges and Immunities Clause. These students 
should not be penalized for moving into a state within a certain time frame 
and then attending a university there, and they certainly should not be 
penalized for being a “new” resident as opposed to being a more established 
resident. Any requirement that goes beyond simply requiring a showing of 
physical presence and intent to remain indefinitely will end up 
discriminating against some bona fide residents by denying them privileges 
that they deserve as residents.203 Because durational residency requirements 
go beyond this by imposing essentially a waiting period in order for 
residents to become eligible for in-state tuition, this practice is questionable 
at least.204 
Durational residency requirements further create arbitrary 
classifications among residents that do not serve to further a compelling 
state interest. States may have a compelling interest in the fiscal integrity of 
their higher education institutions, but this interest should not be served at 
the expense of discriminating against students who have moved into the 
state more recently than others. These durational residency requirements 
penalize those residents who have more recently exercised their right to 
travel, with the penalty coming in the form of out-of-state tuition costs that 
are far higher than the in-state tuition costs charged to residents who have 
been in the state longer.205 By charging these students out-of-state tuition, 
the state is not treating these students the same way it treats other citizens, 
and is thus denying these students a privilege of the state to which the 
student should be entitled. The judicial system should ensure that those who 
are entitled to the benefit of in-state tuition receive it.206 
CONCLUSION 
Choosing where to attend college is one of the most important 
decisions in the life of a student, and some feel as though their educational 
needs can be best met at a university in a state far away, or even just next 
door, from the state in which the student has lived his or her whole life. The 
high costs of out-of-state tuition rates are more than enough to deter anyone 
from wanting to pursue an educational path outside of the home state, and 
the constitutional implications of the differentiations between in-state and 
out-of-state tuition further erode the necessity of the practice. Students who 
attend college in their states of residence receive the benefit of lower in-
state tuition rates, and this benefit constitutes a privilege that states deem 
nonresidents unworthy of receiving. Furthermore, even if a student moves 
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into a new state and resides there, the student still will not receive the 
privilege of in-state tuition if that student moved into the state too soon 
before enrolling in a state university. 
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV establishes that 
a state must treat all United States citizens—regardless of status as a state 
resident or nonresident—alike and shall not provide privileges and 
immunities to its citizens that it refuses to provide to those who come into 
the state from a foreign state. This same protection is afforded to the people 
as applied to the states through the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which ensures to citizens that states will not 
abridge their privileges and immunities. Further protected by the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the right to travel, 
which is an affirmative right granted to the people that gives United States 
citizens the freedom to travel from state to state and establish residence in 
another state without being treated as lesser than residents already living in 
the state. 
In-state tuition rates violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
of Article IV because, quite simply, the practice allows states to treat some 
United States citizens differently than others. Higher education plays a 
significant role in the unity of the Nation as a whole, and it is 
constitutionally impermissible to impose a much higher price tag on higher 
education upon someone just because they came into the state from another 
one. Durational residency requirements, which state universities use to 
determine whether a student is a bona fide resident or not, violate the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by 
infringing upon the right to travel. These durational residency requirements 
create discriminatory classes of citizens, classifying someone as a 
nonresident just because they came into the state more recently than others 
may have and completely disregarding whether that person intends to 
remain in the state indefinitely. These discriminatory classifications give 
states a basis for determining whether a student must pay out-of-state 
tuition rates or receive the benefit of in-state tuition, which directly 
penalizes the right to travel by denying newer residents in-state tuition rates 
due to the student’s exercise of his or her right to travel. 
Ultimately, out-of-state tuition rates present a substantial obstacle 
to the student who wishes to leave his or her home state and attend a 
university elsewhere, particularly the student who is entirely unable to 
afford the high costs associated with out-of-state tuition. The student would 
either have to move to the new state and wait for the qualifying period of 
time, which is often six months to a year, before enrolling in and beginning 
a higher education or just forego the opportunity to learn at his or her 
university of choice in a foreign state and remain in his or her home state. 
Neither of those options would appear to be particularly appealing to a 
student whose university of choice is in a foreign state, and the student 
certainly should never be treated as though he or she is not worthy of the 
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privileges and immunities of the citizens who already live in the state in 
which the university is located. 
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